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Abstract: This paper examines the outlook and strategies of local political elites in Eastern and 
Central European (ECE) countries. The specific focus is on four elite groups in four towns that 
have similar demography and employ similar developmental strategies: Tecuci (Galați county, 
Romania), Česká Lípa (Liberec region, the Czech Republic), Oleśnica (Lower Silesia 
voievodship, Poland), and Gyula (Békés county, Hungary). The investigation will be carried out 
through the prism of the members of the Municipal Councils in order to identify (a) the values of 
these local political elites (b) their interactions with other groups and networks of power at local 
level, and (c) their priorities. The level of decentralization specific to each of the four countries is 
employed as the major explanatory variable for the differences encountered. In addition, the 
explanation focuses also on legacies of the ancien régime, experienced locally. From the study, 
three models of local leadership in ECEs are proposed: “predominantly elitist”, “democratic 
elitist”, and “predominantly democratic”. Future studies can build upon this proposal by verifying 
the validity and pertinence of the models in similar cases throughout the region.  
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I. Introductory remarks. Theoretical assessments  
“[Society’s elites are] persons with the organized capacity to make real political trouble 
without being promptly repressed” (Higley, 2010: 161-176). 
The social biography of local political elites can be perceived as “a set of social 
resources which are transformed in official positions and in influence, positions and 
influence that are not available those who do not possess such resources. The access 
to the political class demands the employ with increased ability of the personal 
resources […]” (Stoica, 2003: 107). Moreover, as Harasymiw has aptly observed, “the 
composition of political elites is relevant to the content of public policies” (Harasymiw, 
1984: 3), the members of the local elite’s social background being partly responsible for 
the policy priorities within their community. Hence, the elites’ social characteristics 
constituted, at an initial phase, the key components of their eligibility in the recruitment 
and party nomination processes.    
Conversely, analysing the opinions and attitudes adopted by the local political elite is 
instrumental and paramount in the description of this group. In reference to the views, 
perceptions, opinions, and attitudes of the local political elite, and starting from the 
plausible assumption that the preferences, orientations, and values of the leaders matter 
more than those of the masses, Robert Putnam (1976: 80) identifies four major 
orientations in the attitudes of the political elite. These are cognitive orientations 
(predispositions based on which individuals interpret the existing reality; e.g., the 
attitudes regarding the social conflict); normative orientations (assessments regarding 
the way the society should be; e.g., the attitudes, ideologically motivated, towards the 
economical equality); interpersonal orientations (perceptions about the other segments 
of the political elite); and stylistic orientations (“structural characteristics of the beliefs 
systems of the political elite” (Stoica, 2003: 179)).  
Certain values embraced by the representatives of the local political elite can be 
explained by their social background. For instance, it is expected that those coming from 
lower class families are inclined to favor economic equality. Other values are acquired 
through socialization, which includes the type of education received, episodes of primary 
socialization, and so on. These values and orientations are further drawn into political 
interactions with other groups. Eventually, politics is about personal interaction—
between individuals perceiving the same goal, between those pursuing different aims; 
between institutions, between institutions and other groups, between institutions and the 
citizen, etc. Government is about interactions between the rulers and the ruled. It is 
about the formation of power networks. Ultimately, members of the political elite, by the 
very nature of their occupation, must interact with other individuals, groups, and 
institutions. As a matter of fact, the interactions, contacts, links, and connections of local 
political elites, their nature and their complexity, are indicators in assessing the degree 
of integration of this particular group within the existing societal framework. As Stoica 
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(2003: 153) states “[a] high frequency of interactions can be seen as an indicator of a 
solid integration of the political elite”. As a result, the activities and actions of the political 
elite become viable and meaningful for society.  
A series of scholars have convincingly argued that the political elite are a very coherent, 
homogenous group of individuals, establishing strong unbreakable connections with 
some other groups. Famously, C. Wright-Mills argues, in his The Power Elite (1956) that 
the political elite (the “political directorate”) is tightly linked to the economical (the 
“corporate chief tenets”) and military elites (the “war lords”). The connections, Wright-
Mills further contends, stem from childhood; the members of these three groups shared 
the same familial and educational backgrounds, established links since high school or 
college and, since then, preserved the same personal relations. They typically meet in 
informal rather than formal settings and there are even psychological similarities 
between them (e.g., their behavior is the same in contexts of crisis) (Wright-Mills, 1956).    
The local political elite is formed, after all, to lead, decide, and implement public policies; 
in short, to promote the general good of citizens. Generally, it is perceived that the local 
political class should provide for the town and its citizens. The priorities of the local 
political elites concerning municipal public policies in different domains represent an 
instrument for describing their orientations, their perceptions regarding the problems the 
town where they exert their influence and power, and their views regarding the 
capabilities in finding solutions for such problems. Solving public problems enhances the 
reputation and popularity of local political elites. The socio-demographical profile, the 
interactions with other groups, and value-orientations of the local leadership (just as 
those of the political elite at the national and regional levels of government) tend to 
influence a certain strategy prioritization locally. Yet, these dependent variables are 
shaped, in turn, by independent factors (institutional, cultural, or historical). This paper 
refers to, and briefly tackles, two of these factors: the level of decentralization and the 
legacy of the former regime.  
II. Methodological remarks: the case studies, research objectives, 
questions, and methods 
The present research is concerned with the issue of local leadership in East-Central 
Europe. Concretely, the intended research started as an attempt to examine, in a 
comparative manner, the profile and the role of the local political elites in four transitional 
democracies (Romania, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary) and the elites’ 
impact on local development. Basing the case selection on the logic of the most similar 
design systems, the study focuses on four small towns, Tecuci, Česká Lípa, Oleśnica, 
and Gyula. These towns are quite similar in terms of demographics (roughly 40,000 
inhabitants) and developmental strategies (an economy based on the alimentary 
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industry and on commerce activities, etc.)2. Hence, the scope of the research was 
initially rather descriptive and exploratory; an inductive, observatory process that 
inquires into a range of aspects worth pointing out when dealing with and discussing on 
the study of political elites. Surely, after gathering the data and being confronted with the 
stark differences among the four towns (in terms of the elites’ socio-demographical 
profile, interactions, value-orientations, and, eventually, of strategy prioritization at the 
local level), the question about the factors, the independent variables that might account 
for both these differences and similarities, will be inevitably raised.  
 Therefore, four principal research questions are of interest here:  
What main socio-demographical features do the local political elites of Tecuci, Česká 
Lípa, Oleśnica, and Gyula display? 
What values, perceptions, and orientations are embraced by the members of the local 
political elites in Tecuci, Česká Lípa, Oleśnica, and Gyula? What are their attitudes 
towards key aspects concerning democracy, decentralization and autonomy, and 
cultural-geographical self-identification?  
What are the most frequent contacts and interactions of the local political elites of 
Tecuci, Česká Lípa, Oleśnica, and Gyula ?   
How do the local political elites in Tecuci, Česká Lípa, Oleśnica, and Gyula prioritize 
locally?  
Under the guidance and supplementary insight provided by these two tentative 
explanations using the degree of decentralization and the “legacy” of the communist 
ancien régime, a typology of local political elites in ECE is constructed, with the aim of 
illuminating and systematizing the diversity in local elites’ profile, interactions, attitudes 
and orientations, and priorities. The next two sections constitute an attempt to account 
for the discrepancies among cases, by introducing the typology of local leadership in 
ECE and the two explanatory variables. The limitations of the models proposed are 
presented in the concluding sections.     
To define the elite groups at the level of the four communities, the paper employs the 
positional method of identifying and analyzing the local political elites, which 
operationalizes the phrase “local political elites” as that group comprising those 
individuals in legislative and executive positions within the local leading, decision-
making structure. The resulting population of the empirical research was thus 
represented by the members of the Local/Municipal Councils in Tecuci (19 persons), 
Česká Lípa (25 persons), Oleśnica (22 persons), and Gyula (21 persons) as they were 
in 2011-2013. The methods of gathering data favored by this paper include: the 
                                               
2
 The manner in which the four towns were chosen corresponds to an initial selection based on 
the demographical and economic criteria, coupled with a convenience selection (i.e., those 
administrations that responded to the researcher’s call).  
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administration of a standard written questionnaire, document analysis on the minutes of 
the meetings of the four Councils, and participatory observation during the sessions of 
the Councils and of their specialized Committees. 
III. Results 
1.  How elitist is the local political elite in Tecuci, Česká Lípa, Oleśnica, and Gyula ? 
Following Eldersveld (1989), the present research asks the question of how “elitist” are 
the local political elite in Tecuci, Česká Lípa, Oleśnica, and Gyula? This does not 
exclusively refer to the economic status the members of the Local (Municipal) Council 
display, but also to their general perceptions regarding  democratic features such as 
citizen participation, social mobility, economic equality, and so on, and to the level of 
congruence between their values and perceptions and those of the people they 
represent (the electorate). In order to further assess the degree of social mobility within 
the local political elite, one major indicator analyzed here is the occupation of the 
fathers’ of members of the Municipal Council. Moreover, the social background of a local 
representative can provide a hint concerning his perceptions towards poorer sectors of 
the population, towards the socially disadvantaged. In the case of Tecuci, according to 
the answers in the questionnaire provided by the members of the Local Council, the 
majority of the local councilors (78.94%) come from a lower or working class-based 
background. In such cases, their fathers had only a lower to middle educational level 
(with only four or eight graduated classes after an elementary education). For Česká 
Lípa, the Council comprises largely individuals coming from lower and working class 
families (68%), showing only a very slight difference from Tecuci. For Oleśnica, the 
percentage of councilors coming from a lower, working class background is the lowest 
amongst the four cases with only 65% bearing such ascendancy, comparable to the 
members of the Local Council in Gyula who records a proportion of 67% of cases of 
working class background. The application of “independence” model3 in the case of 
local political elite in Tecuci, Česká Lípa, Oleśnica, and Gyula demonstrates a 
predominately ascendant social mobility4 of the members of the Local Councils. There 
                                               
3
 The “independence model” and the “agglutination model” (proposed by Lasswell (1965, pp. 9) 
and Putnam (1976, p. 22)) are two opposing approaches of answering the question on why 
some people enter politics, while others do not. The former refers to the dynamics in which all 
citizens have the same chances of entering the political elite, and the main consideration of 
entering politics is that of reflecting the main social cleavages in the society/ community. The 
latter refers to the dynamics in which only those citizens sharing some special traits enter 
political elite (e.g. prestige, high social status, high educational level, moral stance, economic 
prominence, etc.). Consequently, in the case of the “agglutination model”, the levels of 
ascendant social mobility appear higher, for they illustrate once more the peculiar position of 
the members of the political elite (in comparison to its constituency).     
4
 "Ascendant social mobility" describes the situation in which the sons/ daughters (in this case, 
the members of the Municipal Councils) belong to a social class that is superior to the one to 
which their fathers belonged. 
Marin, Profile 64 
 
are no descendingly mobile5 municipal councilors from a social perspective, and only 
three cases (15.78%) for Tecuci, eight cases (32%) for Česká Lípa, ten cases (45.45%) 
for Oleśnica, and seven cases (33.33%) for Gyula, of socially immobile6. Using 
Boudon’s (1973) formula for the calculation of the rate of ascendant social mobility of 
local political elite,  
 
 (for Tecuci),  (for Česká Lípa),  
 (for Oleśnica), and  (for Gyula),  
The result shows that 84.21% of the members of the Local Council in Tecuci, 68% of the 
members of the Municipal Council in Česká Lípa, only 31.57% of the members of the 
Municipal Council in Oleśnica, and 41% of the members of the Municipal Council in 
Gyula are socially and occupationally, in an ascendant social position in comparison to 
their fathers. The profile of the local councilor in the four cases is completed by other 
socio-demographical indicators (see Tables 1 and 2). 
 
Table 1. The professional status of the municipal councilors in Tecuci, Česká Lípa, Oleśnica, and 
Gyula 
 Tecuci  Česká 
Lípa  
Oleśnica  Gyula  
Engineer  47.36%  44%   23%  
Teacher  21.05%  12%  50% + 8.33% 
(academics)  
46%  
Jurist (lawyer, notary public, 
etc.)  
15.78%  12%  8.33%  7%  
Physician  5.26%  12%   7%  
Welder  5.26%     
Mechanic  5.26%     
Psychologist   4%    
Electrician   4%    
IT Expert   4%    
Architect   4%    
Musician/ artist – painter   4%  8.33%   
Entrepreneur/ businessman    8.33%   
Civil servant    16.66%  17%  
                                               
5
 "Descendant social mobility" describes the situation in which the sons/ daughters (in this case, 
the municipal councilors) belong to a social class that is inferior to the one to which their 
fathers belonged. 
6
 "Social immobility" describes the situation in which the sons/ daughters (in this case, the local/ 
municipal councilors) belong to the same social class as the one to which their fathers 
belonged. 
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Table 2. The age distribution in the Local/ Municipal Councils of Tecuci, Česká Lípa, Oleśnica, 
and Gyula 
 
Tecuci  Česká Lípa  Oleśnica  Gyula  
20-29  
 
0%  8%  0%  0%  
30-39  5.26%  24%  7.14%  4%  
40-49  31.57%  16%  42.85%  51%  
50-59  36.84%  40%  28.57%  23%  
60-69  21.05%  12%  21.42%  18%  
70-79  5.26%  0%  0%  4%  
Over 80  0%  0%  
 
0%  0%  
The inquiry into the socio-demographical indicators showed that typically, the profile of 
the local councilor would feature the following traits: 
The typical profile of a local councilor in Tecuci is that of a 52.6 years old married man 
born in Tecuci, who graduated from a technical or technological university with a degree. 
He is likely to be a Christian-Orthodox (even though not a devoted practitioner), coming 
from a lower, working class or peasant family (having, as a result, no other relatives 
involved in politics), but being himself a member of the middle class with an average 
income of approximately 42,891 lei yearly. In addition, he likely to be involved in local 
private business in the sphere of commerce and food industry (73.68% of cases). 
The typical profile of a local councilor in Česká Lípa is that of 47.24 years old married 
man born in Česká Lípa, who graduated with a technological master or advanced 
degree. He is likely to be a member of the middle class, an atheist (even though 
informally subscribing to the Christian-like moral construct), with a lower or working 
class background, with no relatives engaged in politics. 
The typical profile of a local councilor in Oleśnica is that of a 50.2 years old married man 
born in Oleśnica, who graduated from humanist university studies (generally, a teacher). 
He is likely to be a Catholic (and a devoted practitioner), coming from a middle class 
milleau, but with no other relatives involved in politics, himself part of the middle class 
and former activist in the civil society. 
Marin, Profile 66 
 
Finally, the typical profile of a local councilor in Gyula is that of a 50.1 years old married 
man born in Gyula, a graduate of humanist or social sciences university studies. He is 
likely to be a Protestant Christian (though not a devoted practitioner), coming from a 
middle class background (the “petite-bourgeoisie”), with himself being a member of the 
middle class, with no relatives engaged in politics.     
What is, specifically, the importance of the socio-demographical profile of the local 
political elite? Marvick is illuminating in this respect: “If we know how the participants [in 
the political game] got there, where they came from, by what pathways, what ideas, 
skills and contacts they acquired or discarded along the way, then we will have a better 
understanding of political events. […] [K]nowing their abilities, sensitivities, aims and 
credentials, we are better able to anticipate what they say and do, and to evaluate elites, 
institutions and systems performance.” (Marvick, 1968: 273-282) 
2. The attitudes and orientations of the local councilors in Tecuci, Česká Lípa, 
Oleśnica, and Gyula   
The present research evaluated the attitudes of the local political elite towards four 
values referring to the fundamentals of the democratic process and quantified by 
question no. 9 in the administered questionnaire: citizen participation; gradual, 
innovative change; the importance of the political conflict; and, economic equality. The 
attitudes of the members of the Local Councils towards state intervention in the 
economy were also taken into consideration, while a sixth value referred to local 
autonomy and decentralization, two processes permanently on the agenda of the post-
communist governments. The attitudes towards state intervention in economy and local 
autonomy and decentralization were quantified using an attitudinal intensity scale (I 
strongly agree with – I agree with – I partially agree with – I disagree with – I strongly 
disagree with – Don’t know/ don’t answer). 
According to the answers delivered by the local councilors, within a democracy, the most 
valued features are those of citizen participation (with an average level of acceptance of 
47.83%), and gradual change (an average level of acceptance of 20.6%). Economic 
equality and conflict avoidance pose some interesting problems to the value orientations 
of these elites. Firstly, there is a clear rejection of economic equality among the local 
councilors of Tecuci, which can be explained by a syndrome of total detachment, 
expressed rhetorically, from the ancién régime. Secondly, for the local councilors of 
Tecuci and Oleśnica, conflict avoidance is significant, which would hint at a monolithical 
behavior inside the Council.  
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Graphs 1, 2, 3, 4. Values orientation of the municipal councilors in Tecuci, Česká Lípa, 
Oleśnica, and Gyula (Q9: “Which of the following characteristics do you value the most 
in a democracy?”) 
From analysing the two values – citizen participation and conflict avoidance – the results 
show that the members of the Local Councils in Tecuci and Oleśnica could be 
characterized as “populists” (accepting citizen participation as a mark of democracy, but 
avoiding political conflict); the members of the Municipal Councils in Česká Lípa and 
Gyula are largely “democrats” (accepting both citizen participation and political conflict 
as features of democracy) (See Table 4).  
 
Table 3. The features of local leadership, according to its attitudes towards state 
intervention in economy and economic equality 
 
State intervention in economy 
Acceptance  Rejection  
Economic 
equality  
Acceptance  Statists-egalitarianists  Anti-statists-egalitarianists  
Rejection  Statists-anti-egalitarianists  Anti-statists-anti-
egalitarianists  
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Table 4. The features of local leadership, according to its attitude towards political 
conflict and citizen participation 
 
Political conflict 
Acceptance  Avoidance  
Citizen 
participation  
Acceptance  Democrats  Populists  
Rejection  Pluralists  Authoritarianists  
The answers provided in the questionnaire by the members of the Municipal 
Councils in Tecuci, Česká Lípa, Oleśnica, and Gyula, in respect to the state 
intervention in economy and to the prospects of further decentralization and local 
autonomy, reveal the following. First, a local leadership in Tecuci who is very 
enthusiastic about decentralization, sometimes without actually being aware of 
the whole palette of responsibilities that increased decentralization generates, 
but quite undecided about the idea of the interventionist state (partly because the 
political elite coincides with the economic elite, and locally, it becomes easier to 
act as private entrepreneurs, though enjoying the state subsidies). Second, a 
local leadership in Česká Lípa who presents a real skepticism in respect to an 
already significantly decentralized distribution of power, and generally favorable 
to the state intervention in economy, particularly in times of crisis. Third, a local 
leadership in Oleśnica who is much in favor of both the protectionist state and of 
increased decentralization and local autonomy (with significant proportion of 
respondents being “strongly in favor” of the two). Fourth, a local leadership in 
Gyula who generally holds a positive stance towards increased decentralization 
and its benefits, and a rather cautious stance regarding the state intervention in 
economy, partly because of the government’s attitude in respect to the most 
recent financial crisis. 
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Graph 5. The attitudes of the local councilors in respect to the state intervention in 
economy (Q10: “How do you perceive state intervention in economy?”) 
 
Graph 6. The attitudes of the local councilors in respect to the prospects of increased 
decentralization (Q11: “How do you think about greater local autonomy and 
decentralization, granted by the central authorities?”) 
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From the analysis of the two value orientations of state intervention in economy 
and economic equality, it is discovered that one one hand, the members of the 
Local Councils in Tecuci, Česká Lípa, and Gyula could be coined “statists-anti-
egalitarianists” (largely accepting the state intervention in economy, particularly in 
times of crisis, but rejecting economic equality as a mark of a working 
democracy). On the other hand, the members of the Municipal Council in 
Oleśnica could be labeled as “statists-egalitarianists” (accepting both the 
protectionist state and economic equality as a feature of democracy, hence the 
general idea of the “welfare society”) (See Table 3).  
3. The interactions and contacts of the local councilors in Tecuci, Česká Lípa, 
Oleśnica, and Gyula, with other groups 
The present study proposes a rather dynamic approach to the analysis of local elite’s 
interactions with other groups and institutions, in which the members of the Local/ 
Municipal Councils were asked to answer the question about interactions in their 
capacity as individuals (i.e., as businessmen, as neighbors, as members of some 
families, as influential persons within the community, as persons trying to change the 
existing situation of the town, etc.) for better. In this evaluation, the Local/ Municipal 
Councils were not perceived as comprehensive, unified local institutions, establishing 
formal contacts, in a legal and conventional manner, with other institutions and with 
groups of individuals; rather, they were seen as groups of individuals, part of the local 
political elite, each of them preserving and forming network of interactions with different 
other groups. Moreover, when trying to advance their own or their community’s interests, 
these people become dependent on certain groups or persons, therefore establishing 
inevitable interactions.7 In addition, the frequency, nature, and content of the different 
interactions local political elites establish and maintain are of veritable significance for 
drafting and advancing the policy agenda locally and for prioritization strategy, generally.   
 
 
                                               
7
 The main intention was only a hierarchical ranking and classification of thirteen groups with 
which a local councilor is prone to establish stable interactions. These are business groups, 
neighborhood groups, civic and reform groups, religious groups, ethnic groups, trade unions, 
close friends and supporters, local media, other local elective officials, state legislators 
(senators, MPs), other town administrators (mayors, deputy mayors), county/ regional 
administrators (prefects, deputy prefects) and members of the national executives (ministers, 
state secretaries, etc.). The selection of these thirteen groups was based on the “Lecture II” of 
S. Eldersveld’s study Political Elites in Modern Societies (1989: 62) (nine out of his fifteen 
groups were used in the present research, while the other four came as a logical result of 
Romanian, Czech, Polish, and Hungarian legal realities). 
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Graph 7. The interactions and contacts of the local councilors (Q8: “To which of the 
following groups do you have the most numerous contacts/ interactions?”) 
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The results of the questionnaire administered on the members of the four Local/ 
Municipal Councils might be relevant in the construction of the networks of power at the 
local level for each of the four cases. However, due to the space limits of this paper, a 
series of observations will be drawn solely from the proportion (and, hence, the impact) 
of each of the thirteen groups out of the total number of interactions established by the 
local political elite in each town. Therefore, a first remark that can be easily drawn from 
the analysis of the results is the increased (geographical) isolation of the four groups of 
local political elites: the contacts with those groups that transcend the limits of the 
constituency (i.e., those with the national administrators, with county administrators, with 
other city / town administrators, with state legislators, etc.) account, generally, for only 
1.38312% of the total number of interactions of the elite group. The most isolated (i.e., 
confined to their own constituency) are the municipal councilors in Česká Lípa (with an 
average of 0.395% of the interactions focused only on other town administrators, such 
as mayors), and Oleśnica (with an average of 0.6575% of the contacts concentrated 
solely on county administrators, such as the voivodes). In fact, these two elite groups 
have no contacts with the national level and only sporadic interactions at the regional 
level. The level of geographic isolation decreased with the local elites in Gyula which is 
the only elite among the four cases to maintain relations with the central administration 
(with an average of 1.4375% of the total number of interactions) and Tecuci, which is the 
only elite out of the four elite groups to preserve its contacts with the state legislators 
(with an average of 3.0425% of the contacts). Usually, geographical – accompanied by 
an elitist – isolation indicates an elite that is particularly interested in the problems within 
the community it governs, having, at the same time, the necessary political power and 
discretion to decide on policy agenda and policy making and implementation locally. 
Equally valid is the fact that conveying local problems to the regional or central levels, in 
those cases in which reaching a solution locally would necessitate three-tiered 
approach, is of paramount importance in the dynamics of interactions and contacts 
between elites situated at different levels. In those constituencies in which political 
power and responsibility in decision-making appears insufficient to the local elites, the 
increased frequency of contacts exceeding the limits of the governed community is 
evident (e.g., Tecuci).  
The special case of the ethnic and religious groups bears a veritable significance in 
multicultural communities, where leadership are able to channel the diversity of 
grievances and needs of the members of minorities and, sometimes, to influence the 
local agenda setting, particularly in the cultural sphere. Nevertheless, the actual impact 
of ethnic and religious groups (mainly, minority groups, but also the organized 
representatives of the religious majority) is terribly undermined in ethnically and 
religiously homogeneous communities, as it is largely the situation of the four towns 
under scrutiny. Understandably, the average significance of the interactions of the four 
elite groups with the ethnic groups is 2.775% of the total number of contacts, whereas 
the average significance of the interactions with the religious groups is 2.645%. The 
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political elites in Oleśnica maintain no formal relation with the fairly small German 
minority, while the relations with the mainly Catholic organizations in the town account 
for only 2.63% of the whole palette of the elite’s relations. For the municipal councilors in 
Česká Lípa, the contacts with the small Slovak minority represent only 1.58% of the 
contacts, while the contacts with the Protestants and the Catholics are equally 
insignificant. This is somehow paradoxical, given the fact that the majority of Czechs are 
atheistic. 
4. The priorities of the local councilors in Tecuci, Česká Lípa, Oleśnica, and Gyula  
The following observations are meant to identify and to sketch the public agenda of the 
members of the Local/ Municipal Councils in Tecuci, in Česká Lípa, in Oleśnica, in 
Gyula, by pointing out, based on the answers provided in the questionnaires, their 
priorities in solving certain problems the four towns confront and the level of importance 
they give to different local problems.  
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Table 5. The priorities of the municipal councilors (Q4: “To which of the field below do 
you consider a special attention should be given?”; Q5: “In which of the fields below do 
you consider significant measures can be taken at the local level (that sufficient political 
power exists at the local level for ensuring beneficial changes?”; Q6: “In which of the 
fields below do you consider efficient and beneficial measures had been already taken 
in your town during the last years?”; Q7: “On which of the fields below do you consider 
you are able to exercise a personal influence in taking effective measures?”) 
 
The study and the administered questionnaire differentiate between four forms of 
prioritization: (a) spheres to which a special importance should be granted (political 
responsiveness and policy prognosis); (b) spheres in which considerable measures can 
be taken at the local level (political/ policy power and responsibility); (c) spheres in 
which effective measures had already been taken (political accountability and policy 
diagnosis), and (d) spheres in which the local councilor exerts a personal influence 
(personal responsibility and influence). For the four cases selected, the strategy 
prioritization focuses generally on economic equality (an average score of 21.0275%) 
and social services, including housing and unemployment (an average score of 
19.8225%). To some degree less important, though still prioritized are such spheres of 
activity at the local level as education (an average score of 16.6575%) and public 
improvements (an average score of 16.43%). The least important for the strategy 
prioritization of the four local political elites are, predictably, minority rights/ interethnic 
relations (an average score of 2.6075%) and pollution (an average score of 2.875%). 
A special attention should be paid on those indicators of policy prognosis and policy 
power/ responsibility. Hence, though the elites in Tecuci assign an increased importance 
to the so-called “hard” spheres of competence in local government (public 
improvements – 16.98%; public safety – 16.98%, and economic development – 
24.52%), they consider that there resides power to implement changes locally only in 
such rather “soft” domains as: culture, sport and recreation/ youth activities (20.33%) 
and social services (18.64%). A sentiment of political impotance among those cases of 
less-decentralized elites is that although they identify quite clearly and pertinently the 
spheres in which important measures should be taken locally, they are either unwilling or 
irresponsible to operate changes for their communities in key spheres, vital for the 
development of their constituencies. Conversely, for both Česká Lípa and Oleśnica, – 
the two cases in which significant degrees of decentralization improved the level of 
responsibility at the level of local policy and comprehensive and effective prioritization –, 
the local political elites tend to equate the spheres in which a special importance should 
be granted with those spheres in which considerable measures can be taken at the local 
level: e.g., public improvements (24.19% to 6.98%, for Česká Lípa, and 11.9%, for both 
indicators, in the case of Oleśnica), social services (30.64% to 23.8%, for Česká Lípa, 
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and 16.66%, for both indicators for Oleśnica), economic development (22.58% to 
14.28%, for Česká Lípa, and 16.66%, for both indicators in the case of Oleśnica). 
Measures already operated have been undertaken in those “hard” spheres, as well: 
public improvements and social services (23.07% and 25%, respectively, for Česká 
Lípa; 21.19% and 19.04%, respectively, for Oleśnica). Once more, the policy 
responsibility and prioritization are indicated as higher for the highly decentralized local 
political elites. 
A constant policy concern for local decision-makers, irrespective of the town they 
govern, is that of public safety, understood basically as policing and civilian intervention 
and management in case of emergency. The importance assigned to public safety is 
similar throughout the four cases: 16.98% for Tecuci; 3.22% for Česká Lípa; 4.76% for 
Oleśnica; 4.25% for Gyula, with an average of 7.3025% importance locally.   
Somehow expectedly, the local focus of decision-makers diverges from such policy 
domains as pollution and interethnic relations and minority rights. First, given the 
absence of significant minority groups, the need for policy in this sphere is lower, i.e., in 
ethnically homogeneous communities, the importance of minority rights policies 
decreases, while in ethnically heterogeneous communities, policies in the sphere of 
minority rights are significant. Secondly, the importance of environmental matters and 
pollution in developing countries – as is the case with those in East-Central Europe – is 
still a topic of debate; moreover, in small urban settings, the matter of pollution does not 
poses considerable hardship in decision-making, though perceived as a liability.  
IV. An attempted typology of local political elites in ECE 
Based on the observations drawn from the four cases under scrutiny, regarding the local 
elites’ socio-demographical profile, the attitudes and orientations they display, their 
interactions with other groups, and their prioritization strategy at the community level, 
the present paper advances a tentative threefold typology, meant to isolate and to 
systematize the main differences between the cases. Consequently, the proposed 
taxonomy differentiates among: (1) “predominantly elitistic” local elites, (2) “democratic 
elitist” local elites, and (3) “predominantly democratic” local elites.  
The “predominantly elitistic” (e.g., Tecuci) are those elites characterized by a significant 
degree of “elite distinctiveness”,  i.e., perceiving themselves, as a group or individually, 
as separate from the bulk of the town’s population, as part of a special, superior caste of 
notables and local potentates, hence prone to favor the clear gap between the rulers 
and the ruled. Enjoying considerable levels of prestige and reputation, this type of local 
elites display however a sense of reluctance in effectively dealing with the community’s 
main problems, on the basis that power at the local level is insufficient to allow the 
leadership here to implement change. Therefore, it might be concluded that the 
“predominately elitist” local leadership corresponds to those communities presenting low 
degrees of decentralization and local autonomy. Additionally, the “predominantly elitistic” 
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local elites are tightly linked to a “political” model, for their recruitment is almost 
exclusively intramural, all those comprising the local leadership being party members 
and benefiting from the otherwise indispensable support of the party, whose local 
branches are highly dependent of the central one. Interestingly, the “predominantly 
elitistic” groups are those that most closely approximate the Aristotelian desideratum in 
their construction, conception and self-perception: they tend to adhere to an “ethical” 
model of the ideal local councilor, at least declaratively cherishing moral attributes that 
would provide them with some sort of moral superiority as prime marks of 
distinctiveness in respect to their constituency, to the population of their community.      
The “democratic elitist” (e.g., Česká Lípa) are those elites whose traits and profiles point 
to some form of aurea mediocritas between a sense of distinctiveness and the prestige 
they enjoy within the community, on the one hand, and the effective and meaningful 
dedication to their community’s developmental plans, on the other hand. As such, 
though they form a “caste” of notables within the town and are hardly representative to 
the population of the establishments they lead, in socio-demographical terms, they can 
act decisively for the benefit of their town due to a considerable degree of local 
autonomy and decentralized prerogatives, responsibilities and attributions. The local 
councilors of the “democratic elitist” sort remain still largely dependent on the support of 
the political parties, but the local parties appear independent in respect to their central 
branch. Occasionally, “democratic elitist” type corresponds to intramural recruitment of 
locally-established parties, splinters or other quite localized political movements and 
organizations, responding to extremely specific needs and demands or describing 
relatively strong political localism and allowing for factionalism and decentralized, 
territorialized “back-bencher”-ism. In addition, the “democratic elitist” group overlaps with 
a rather “pragmatic” or “technocratic” model of the local councilor, as the most cherished 
attributes of the leadership come to be the professionalism of the local leadership, its 
capacity in decision-making, policy designing and problem-solving. 
“Predominantly democratic” (e.g., Oleśnica and Gyula) are those elites featuring a 
sense of identification with the masses, with the ordinary citizens of the community they 
happen to represent temporarily, a dominating “social sensitivity” that would determine 
their propensity towards social security and welfare strategies in local leadership. This 
type of local elites is juxtaposed to a tradition of decentralization and devolution 
mechanisms that permit them to identify and to implement policies responding to the 
needs of the town. The “predominantly democratic” type of local elites is probably the 
closest to the population it represents in terms of descriptive representation8, for it may 
                                               
8
 “Descriptive representation” refers to that type of representativeness underpinned on the 
mirroring of socio-demographical characteristics of the electorate/ constituency (ethnicity, 
gender, place of birth, age, religion, educational, marital status, etc.) into those of the elected 
representatives (Pitkin, 1967). The importance of “descriptive” (or “passive”) 
representativeness at the local level is confirmed by various empirical endeavors, among 
which: Browning, Marshall, & Tabb, 1984; Fraga, Meier, & England, 1986; Meier & Stewart, 
1991; Meier et al., 2005.   
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include persons of lower education, or people previously involved in directly advocating 
for the interests of some segments in the community (pupils, women, unemployed, 
workers, etc.). These local leaders are usually quite familiar with the problems their town 
confronts with, being especially concerned with social issues (e.g., unemployment, 
social benefits, housing, etc.). The methods of recruiting elites in this context are highly 
inclusive, but the actual specificity of these elites is the extramural fashion (i.e., selection 
of candidates from outside the party cadres) in which they are selected, as their political 
affiliation is futile, if existent. The role of the party in the recruitment process, either local 
or central branches, is virtually insignificant. Consequently, the “predominantly 
democratic” local elites correspond to rather “pragmatic” and “moral” profiles, while the 
“political” model is virtually absent in their case. 
V. Tentative explanations 
As presented above, the present study advances a threefold classification of local 
political leadership, whose underpinnings employ mainly two explanatory variables: (a) 
the level of administrative-fiscal decentralization specific for each of the countries under 
scrutiny, and (2) the “legacy” of the former communist regime, expressed through the 
type of “elite political culture” (Jowitt, 1999). For the level of administrative-fiscal 
decentralization, the paper favors a rather reductionist approach on fiscal, expenditure-
based decentralization, although it acknowledges the importance of various other forms 
of decentralization (vertical, decision-making, appointment, electoral, fiscal, personnel – 
Treisman, 2002; administrative v. political; territorial v. technical – Apostol Tofan, 2008; 
vertical v. horizontal; functional v. territorial – Stoica, 2003; internal v. external). For this 
purpose, it employs the average indexes of decentralization currently utilized by the 
World Bank and the IMF in the issuing of their annual reports9, operationalizing 
“decentralization” as the subnational share of general government expenditure. In order 
to properly account for the differences in the level of fiscal-administrative 
decentralization among the four cases, this paper adds to these indexes three 
thresholds: (a) a significant level of administrative and fiscal decentralization describes 
the countries whose average subnational share of general expenditure is higher than 
50%; (b) a standard level of decentralization is specific for those countries with an 
average local and regional share of general government expenditure is higher than 
30%, but lower than 50%; and (c) a low level of decentralization characterizes the 
countries with a subnational share of general government expenditure lower than 30%. 
                                               
9
 Along a series of domains of considerable interest at the local level (infrastructure, education, 
healthcare, public security, transportation, social services (including housing and 
unemployment relief), cultural and recreational activities, etc.), it evaluates the extent to which 
they are dealt with nationally, regionally and locally. This evaluation is constructed primarily 
based on pieces of legislation, bylaws, internal regulations of different administrative and 
executive bodies, as well as on some empirical endeavors undertaken by the World Bank and 
the IMF expertise. 
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Table 6. The proportion of subnational share of general government expenditure 
(expressed as percentage from the total national budget) 
 Public 
order 
& 
Safety 
Education Health Social 
Security 
& 
Welfare 
Housing & 
Communal 
Amenities 
Recreation 
& Culture 
Transportation & 
Communication 
Average 
BULGARIA 2.17 59.53 44.11 8.30 68.95 26.69 12.19 31.70% 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
17.20 17.22 5.98 8.03 68.47 61.89 46.53 32.18% 
HUNGARY 6.86 46.99 44.83 11.99 74.10 43.97 27.64 36.62% 
POLAND 34.30 72.47 87.36 17.49 86.92 76.13 65.34 62.85% 
ROMANIA 4.80 9.23 0.36 2.97 83.01 34.74 17.55 21.80% 
SLOVAKIA 5.69 2.40 0.26 0.49 56.74 27.00 18.78 15.90% 
(Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, IMF, 
Washington, D.C., 2001. The data is selected only for the countries of East-Central 
Europe, former satellites of USSR.) 
 
Conclusively, (a) for the significant level of fiscal-administrative decentralization, the 
Polish case is representative; (b) the standard level of decentralization fits the Czech 
and the Hungarian cases, whereas (c) the low level of decentralization is specific to the 
Romanian case.  
Recent studies have shown the impact of decentralization formulae on the outlook and 
the role of local political elites. Such an empirical concern has been focused primarily on 
Latin America, South Asia (Beard, Miraftab, and Silver, 2008; Smoke, Gómez, and 
Peterson, 2006; Burki, Perry, and Dillinger, 1999; Escobar-Lemmon, 2003; Bardhan, 
2002; Garman, Haggard, and Willis, 2001; Falleti, 2005 etc.), and Africa (Cottingham, 
1970), while the topic has been generally neglected for the developing democracies of 
East-Central Europe. Dora Orlansky (2000: 196) discusses the impact of 
decentralization upon the power-sharing between the central and the local 
administrative layers and upon the extent of political power and responsibility local elites 
are expected to exert. Discussing a series of examples from Africa and South Asia, 
Devarajan et al. (2009: 118-119) refer to the dangers of elite isolation with the increase 
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in decentralized communities and to shifts in delivery of public services once with the 
process of decentralization. Quite interestingly, Merilee S. Grindle (2007: 63-105) 
introduces the example of decentralization in Mexico, concluding that proper fiscal and 
administrative decentralization can result in high levels of political competition and 
satisfaction with the living in the town, both at the level of the local elites and the 
community. It becomes apparent that local leadership modifies its outlook and 
prioritization strategy in the context of change of administrative organization leading to 
increased decentralization. Jonathan Rodden (2004) presents the impact of different 
forms of decentralization upon the city management, but, most importantly, upon the 
degree of elite isolation and passive representation. Finally, opposing two main 
approaches in reference to the impact of decentralization policies – the “liberal-
individualist” and “statist” approaches10 –, Aylin Topal (2012) describes forms of elite 
isolation after the proper implementation of decentralization policies and differences of 
agenda setting of local elites as response to increased decentralization. The fashion in 
which the elites adapt their outlook, value orientation and strategy prioritization is 
partially elaborated in the present paper, with a special focus on particular municipalities 
in four countries of East-Central Europe: Romania, Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Hungary.    
The levels of decentralization may impact the drafting of policy agenda at the local level, 
the strategy prioritization, the degree of elite isolation (i.e., the insistence on contacts 
and interactions confined to the governed municipality), some of the value-orientations, 
etc. Hence, it is expected that a significant level of decentralization would exhibit an 
equally high degree of elite isolation and would induce an orientation towards the so-
called “hard” spheres of activities (e.g., public improvements, infrastructure, economic 
development, public order, etc.), a considerable degree of political responsibility and 
responsiveness, and the identification with a rather “pragmatic” and “technocratic” elite 
profile. On the other hand, it might be easily hypothesized that low levels of 
decentralization can only result in a geographically open elite, in a focus on rather “soft” 
spheres of activity and a policy prioritization accordingly (e.g., education, healthcare, 
culture, youth and recreation activities, etc.), due to a perceived impotence of 
                                               
10
 The „liberal-individualist” approach on decentralization “promotes decentralization policies on 
the premises of efficiency, equity, and responsiveness to local demands. [...] [D]ecentralization 
is the key to implementing the deregulation mechanisms of the state and democratization; 
decentralization policies open new channels for ethnic minorities and social groups to 
participate in the policy-making process” (Topal, 2012: 2; see also: World Bank (2004), Adib et 
al. (eds) (2008), Blair (2000), Bulki, Perry and Dillinger (1999), Campbell (1997, 2003), 
Guigale and Webb (eds) (2000), Parker and Serrano (2000), Peterson (1997), Ribot (2004)). 
The “statist” approach on decentralization suggests that “particular state institutions could 
have significant impact on socioeconomic development” (Topal, 2012: 2; see also: Evans, 
Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, 1985; Bardhan and Mookherjee (eds) (2006), Boone (2003), 
Dickovick (2007), Eaton, (2003, 2004), Grindle (2009), Montero and Samuels (eds) (2004), 
O’Neill (2003, 2005), Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack (2003), Rodríguez (1997), Willis, Garman 
and Haggard (1999)). 
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implementing change locally and a resulting low level of political responsibility, and the 
construction of an elite profile concentrated on “ethical” and “political” models.  
The second explanatory variable refers to the legacy of the ancien régime. In order to 
operationalize this complex variable, this study utilizes the differentiation operated by 
Kitschelt et al. (1999) between three types of communist dictatorship in the countries of 
former Sovietized Europe: (1) “national accommodative” communist dictatorship (e.g., 
Poland and Hungary), (2) “bureaucratic authoritarian” or “welfare” communist 
dictatorship (Jarausch, 1999) (e.g., Czechoslovakia and East Germany), and (3) 
“patrimonial” or “modernizing-nationalizing” communist dictatorship (Petrescu, 2010) 
(e.g., Romania and Bulgaria). 
Depending on the type of communist dictatorship faced by each of the four societies 
under scrutiny here, the elite developed a certain form of “political culture”11, remnant 
features of which have been traduced, reproduced or preserved outright during the 
transition and the period of democratic consolidation. The study favors Jowitt’s concept 
of “elite political culture”12 (1992: 51-52, and 54-56) to refer to those attitudinal and 
                                               
11
 The definition and operationalization of “political culture” have resulted into an overwhelming 
diversity in understanding. Even though, almost all the studies tackling the topic of “political 
culture” revolve around the spiritus rectores G. Almond and S. Verba and their pioneering 
opus magnum The Civic Culture, for the specific study of political elites, R. Putnam famously 
referred to “elite political culture”, defined as some form of attitudinal and behavioral 
aggregates of the elite group, generally constant, hardly changeable, stable ones; the term 
accounts for “patterns of beliefs and attitudes [prevalent among the members of the political 
elite] about the economic, political, social, cultural systems” (Putnam, 1973). In applying the 
observations drawn from the usage of the concept “elite political culture”, one could only 
wonder if the four selected groups forming the Municipal Councils of the municipalities of 
Tecuci, Česká Lípa, Oleśnica, and Gyula have acquired a sense of group consciousness as 
an elite. Such an “elite consciousness” at the local level is difficult to be operationalized and 
subsequently measured, but some attemptive endeavors might employ such indicators as: the 
degree of group cohesion, the acknowledgement of some “special” (i.e., specific) traits a local 
councilor should possess (excepting, of course, the moral, ethical dimension which is by no 
means one of group or status differentiation in the case of elites). Actually, though rhetorically 
catchy and discursively fashionable, the ethical image of the political elite, in the sweet 
Aristotelian tradition, is an obsolete one, and its obsoleteness became conspicuous in the 
literature as early as the beginning of the 20th century, with the famous works of the Italian 
“elitists”, the trio Pareto – Mosca – Michels.  
12
 “Elite political culture” is “a set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal) postures that 
emerge as response to and consequence of a given elite’s identity-forming experiences”. Ken 
Jowitt (1992) defines “elite political culture” somehow in opposition to what he coins as 
“regime political culture” (i.e. “a set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal) postures 
that emerge in response to the institutional definition of social, economic, and political life”) 
and “community political culture” (i.e. “a set of informal adaptative (behavioral and attitudinal) 
postures that emerge in response to the historical relationships between regime and 
community”. For Jowitt, as opposed to any other scholar of “political culture”, the said 
collocation is actually defined in terms of behavioral analysis of the ancien régime: the 
“political culture” is “the set of informal, adaptative postures – behavioral and attitudinal – that 
emerge in response to, and interact with, the set of formal definitions – ideological, policy and 
institutional – that characterize a given level of society.” 
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behavioral traits inherited from the ancien régime, conserved from the central to the 
local level. For instance, a former “patrimonial” regime would result in an increased 
monolithism of the new political elites, whereas a “bureaucratic-authoritarian” would 
produce a political elite who is technocratically-oriented. Finally, a “national-
accommodative” former regime is prone to generate in contemporaneity an elite who is 
rather fragmented, factionalist, allowing for opposition, contestation and certain degree 
of “back-bencherism”, along with a pragmatic attitude in decision-making and profile 
identification (see Kitschelt et al. 1999 and Jowitt 1992). Moreover, a series of socio-
demographical indicators in the elite profile construction are tempered by the nature of 
the former regime, as is the case, for instance, with the rate of ascendant social mobility, 
which is generally higher in previously “patrimonial” communist regimes, while 
decreasing in the case of formerly “bureaucratic-authoritarian” communist dictatorship, 
where there had existed a small group of “petite bourgeoisie”, rather an a large mass of 
peasants out of which democracy later selected its elites.    
V. Concluding remarks 
The study proposes and favors the differentiation among three types of elites, 
underpinned on the specific content of elite political culture and on the set of attributions 
provided by a certain degree of decentralization: 
“Predominantly elitistic” (e.g., Tecuci), corresponding to a former “modernizing-
nationalizing”, “patrimonial” communist dictatorship, followed by “elite reproduction”, and 
low levels of administrative decentralization and local autonomy, presently; 
characterized by a significant degree of “elite distinctiveness”; 
“Democratic elitist” (e.g., Česká Lípa), corresponding to a defunct “national-
accommodative” communist dictatorship, followed by “elite circulation”, and high levels 
of decentralization and local autonomy, in the present; 
“Predominantly democratic” (e.g., Oleśnica and Gyula), corresponding to a former 
“bureaucratic-authoritarian”, “welfare” communist dictatorship, followed by “elite 
circulation”, a tradition of administrative decentralization, and significant levels of local 
autonomy, nowadays.  
Clearly, both the level of decentralization process undertaken in each of the four East-
Central European countries (Romania, Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary) and “the 
legacy” of the old communist regime have generated different outcomes in the local 
elites’ profile, attitudes, prioritization, and interactions. More significant levels of 
administrative and fiscal decentralization indicate a more responsible, pragmatic local 
elite, though largely isolated to the central authorities and sceptical, cautious towards 
the benefits of decentralization. Conversely, a low level of decentralization is prone to 
produce an elite who is prepared to acknowledge political responsibility only for those 
“soft” spheres of policy-design and implementation at the local level; they seem impotent 
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to act effectively in such local domains as economic and infrastructural development, for 
instance. Yet, the impact of decentralization on the “impoverishment” of small-to-
medium-sized towns – as are those studied here – remains an open question, worthy of 
proper and comprehensive consideration. Equally, the “elite political culture” generated 
by each of the three types of defunct communist regime puts a specific imprint on the 
profile and attitudes of the present local elite in ECE. A background of “modernizing 
nationalizing” communist dictatorship influences a high level of social mobility among 
the elites and high degree of monolithism, while a “national accommodative” legacy is 
conducive to relatively low levels of social mobility and a more favourable attitude to 
economic equality and gradual change.  
As mentioned, the initial intent of the research was predominantly exploratory; with the 
gathering of the data, the differences pinpointed needed to be accounted for. The resort 
to two tentative explanations and an attempted typology of local leadership in ECE 
bears inherently both future research trajectories and limitations for the models 
proposed here. The envisaged study proposes a more encompassing approach, 
extended to the cases of other countries of former Sovietized Europe (Bulgaria and 
Slovakia), employing the tentative typology proposed by the paper, hence further testing 
its validity. The features, definitions and types of decentralization and the “legacy of the 
past” differ greatly from one instance to the other. It is particularly this diversity that 
entails differences in the local “elite (general) outlook”, i.e., its attitudes, priorities, value 
orientations, interactions, profiles, degree of representativeness, patterns of recruitment, 
etc. Indeed, the evidence this paper advances refers precisely to the impacts of both the 
degree of decentralization and the “legacy of the former regime” upon the general 
portrait of the local political elite. Four such impacts of the two variables are discussed 
here, namely on: (a) local elite’s socio-demographical profile, (b) local elite’s 
interactions, (c) local elite’s attitudes towards key features of democracy and the state, 
and (d) local elite’s strategy prioritization. Nevertheless, these differences in the local 
elite’s “outlook” in East-Central Europe cannot and should not be traced back to the 
level of decentralization and the “legacy of the past” alone. Due to the limitations of this 
study, other, equally important, independent variables explaining the variations for the 
selected cases, are not considered (e.g., patterns of recruitment, the “system” variables, 
such as the characteristics of the political and the party systems, the tradition of 
“decentralization”, etc.), variables which remain instrumental in accounting for the 
results. The paper acknowledges also other significant limitations, such as: matters of 
representativeness and significance in the case selection (the actual limits of “the most 
similar systems” research design); the shortcomings in generalization and statistical 
analysis, due to the small number of units of analysis; the limits of comparison, due to 
the actual relevance of the selected cases, and those sprung from the use of the 
questionnaire as the main method of data collection; the difficult operationalization of 
“decentralization” and of the “legacy of the past”, etc. While being aware of the important 
limitations, this endeavor might contribute significantly to the existing literature on the 
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effects of decentralization and the “legacy of the past” on the portrait of the local 
leadership in East-Central Europe. Further research on other countries and regions 
undergoing processes of decentralization or democratization (e.g., Latin America, south-
east Asia, India, etc.) might add a comparative note to the present endeavor.    
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